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The Riddle of the Mysterious Patent 
Dance Wrapped in an Enigma: Is the 
Patent Dance of the BPCIA Optional or 
Mandatory? 
Dov Hirsch* 
Recently, the nature of one of the aspects of the Biosimilar, Price, 
Competition, and Innovation Act of 2009 (“BPCIA”) has been called 
into question: Is the “patent dance,” the structured patent dispute reso-
lution process of the BPCIA, mandatory or optional? A mandatory pa-
tent dance requires a biosimilar applicant to comply with all its require-
ments, while an optional patent dance allows the biosimilar applicant to 
opt out of the entire dance if it so chooses. This question is important be-
cause it has the potential to affect that delicate balance of the BPCIA. 
This Note focuses on some of the consequential implications of deciding 
whether the patent dance of the BPCIA is optional or mandatory. This 
Note ultimately argues that the patent dance of the BPCIA should be 
mandatory. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Biologics are the future of the pharmaceutical industry.1 While 
research, development, and spending for new innovative small-
molecule drugs have remained stagnant,2 there has been an explo-
sion in spending and progress in the field of biologics.3 In 2016, the 
annual global spending on biologics alone was projected to be be-
tween $200 billion and $210 billion.4 Some healthcare industry 
analysts predict that, in the United States, biologics will represent 
half of the annual prescription drug spending by 2020.5 This explo-
sion is well deserved, as the most prominent, promising, and prof-
itable cures to major diseases are in the field of biologics.6 Howev-
er, the very nature of biologics and its complex manufacturing and 
development process also make them some of the most expensive 
pharmaceuticals.7 To address this problem, Congress enacted the 
Biosimilar, Price, Competition, and Innovation Act of 2009 
(“BPCIA”).8 
The BPCIA has been described as a “riddle wrapped in a mys-
tery in an enigma.”9 The BPCIA’s complexity stems partly from 
the fact that the nature of a biologic itself is extremely complex and 
not yet fully understood.10 The BPCIA’s location at the intersec-
                                                                                                                            
1 See, e.g., W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics 
Competition and Innovation, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1023, 1026 (2016). 
2 Id. (“Spending on small-molecule drugs is close to stagnant, especially in developed 
countries.”). 
3 IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, THE GLOBAL USE OF MEDICINES: 
OUTLOOK THROUGH 2016 at 3 (2012). 
4 Id. 
5 Price & Rai, supra note 1. 
6 Id.; see Julia Kollewe, World’s 10 Bestselling Prescription Drugs Made $75bn Last 
Year, GUARDIAN (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/mar/27/ 
bestselling-prescription-drugs [http://perma.cc/ZYR6-3PQZ]. 
7 See Henry Grabowski, Follow-on Biologics: Data Exclusivity and the Balance Between 
Innovation and Competition, 7 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 479, 482 (2008); Joyce 
Wing Yan Tam, Note, Biologics Revolution: The Intersection of Biotechnology, Patent Law, 
and Pharmaceutical Regulation, 98 GEO. L.J. 535, 535–36 (2010). 
8 The principal section of the BPCIA is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2012). The 
BPCIA was passed as part of the Patent Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”). 
Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25, 
26, 29, 42 U.S.C). 
9 Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1351 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 
S. Ct. 808 (2017). 
10 See Tam, supra note 7, at 536. 
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tion of patent law and pharmaceutical regulation exacerbates the 
BPCIA’s complexity.11 Furthermore, the BPCIA has the compli-
cated responsibility of accomplishing two countervailing goals.12 
The BPCIA seeks to find the complex, yet delicate, balance be-
tween allowing biosimilar manufacturers to introduce competition 
to counter the unaffordable cost of biologics, while simultaneously 
preserving the incentive for innovators to bring pioneering and es-
sential biologics to market.13 At the same time, the BPCIA must 
maintain the strict standard of pharmaceutical regulation that 
Americans have come to expect and rely upon despite the delicate 
and precise nature of biologics and biosimilars.14 The BPCIA at-
tempts to balance all of these complex, yet crucial aspects.15 
This complexity and sensitivity makes every aspect of the 
BPCIA essential, because the BPCIA was designed to maintain that 
delicate balance between the two countervailing goals of the 
BPCIA.16 Conversely, removing or changing any aspect of the 
                                                                                                                            
11 See, e.g., Linfong Tzeng, Follow-On Biologics, Data Exclusivity, and the FDA, 25 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 135, 156 (2010) (discussing how differences in data exclusivity in the 
patent and regulatory framework are troubling). 
12 See, e.g., Ude Lu, Note, Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act: Striking a 
Delicate Balance Between Innovation and Accessibility, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 613, 650 
(2014) (“[T]he central mission of the BPCIA is to balance two competing interests: 
innovation and accessibility.”). 
13 Id. at 613. 
14 See Vinita Banthia, Note, Biosimilar Regulation: Bringing the United States Up to Speed 
with Other Markets, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 879, 883, 885 (2015) (“An effective 
biosimilar approval pathway would necessarily need to strike a balance between ensuring 
safety and providing affordable access to biologic medicines.”). 
15 See Banthia, supra note 14, at 885; Tam, supra note 7, at 540 (“The resulting statute 
balances the interests of the pioneer drug industry, the generic drug industry, and patients 
seeking access to the best available medicines.”). This balancing of interests is also 
present in other areas of the law. For an example of the balancing of interests in generic 
drugs, see Sarah E. Eurek, Note, Hatch-Waxman Reform and Accelerated Market Entry of 
Generic Drugs: Is Faster Necessarily Better?, 2 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 2 (2003). For an 
example of the balancing of interests with medical devices, see Adam Lewin, Note, 
Medical Device Innovation in America: Tensions Between Food and Drug Law and Patent Law, 
26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 403, 404 (2012) (“The legal structures regulating the introduction 
of medical devices must therefore strike a careful balance between promoting new and 
better devices and ensuring that devices on the market are safe and effective.”). 
16 See Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Protection of Trade Secrets and Patents 
Under the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 285, 
286 (2011). 
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BPCIA may skew this important and delicate balance.17 Therefore, 
it is critical to keep this delicate balance in mind in making a de-
termination regarding any aspect of the BPCIA. 
Recently, the nature of one of the BPCIA’s aspects has been 
called into question: Is the “patent dance,” the structured patent 
dispute resolution process of the BPCIA, mandatory or optional? A 
mandatory patent dance requires a biosimilar applicant to comply 
with all its requirements, while an optional patent dance allows the 
biosimilar applicant to opt out of the entire dance if it so chooses. 
This question is important because it has the potential to affect that 
delicate balance of the BPCIA. 
This Note focuses on some of the consequential implications of 
deciding that the patent dance of the BPCIA is optional versus 
mandatory. This Note ultimately argues that the patent dance of 
the BPCIA should be mandatory. Part I provides the background to 
the BPCIA by explaining what biologics and biosimilars are and 
what makes them unique. Part I continues by explaining what the 
patent dance is and what the Federal Circuit decided about this is-
sue in Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc.18 Part II discusses the implications 
that result as a consequence of an optional patent dance as opposed 
to a mandatory patent dance. Finally, Part III argues that the 
BPCIA constructs a delicate balance to its countervailing goals and, 
therefore, the patent dance should be mandatory to maintain that 
balance. 
I. BACKGROUND ON THE BIOSIMILAR, PRICE, 
COMPETITION, AND INNOVATION ACT 
This Part provides background on the BPCIA and details the 
origins of the question on whether the patent dance is optional or 
mandatory. Section I.A explains what biologics are and what makes 
them different than traditional small molecule drugs. Section I.B 
explains why process patents may be biologic’s strongest source of 
protection. Section I.C outlines the process to bring a successful 
                                                                                                                            
17 Cf. Lu, supra note 12, at 646 (discussing how the current BPCIA’s provisions on 
exclusivity tip the scale in favor of innovator companies, and proposing a different frame 
that better balances innovation and accessibility). 
18 See 794 F.3d 1347, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 808 (2017). 
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biologic to the public in compliance with the relevant federal regu-
lations and how that leads to the astronomical costs of biologics, 
especially contrasted with small molecule drugs. Section I.D ex-
plains what biosimilars are and why traditional generics are not 
available to resolve the problem of high cost as it was for small mo-
lecule drugs. Section I.E outlines the BPCIA and the BPCIA’s pa-
tent dance. Finally, Section I.F discusses the facts of Amgen v. San-
doz and follows its path to the Supreme Court. 
A. What Is a Biologic? 
A biologic is a type of pharmaceutical that is extremely com-
plex19 and intricately dependent on its manufacturing process.20 
The BPCIA defines a biologic, or “biological product,” as a “virus, 
therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood compo-
nent or derivative, allergenic product, protein (except any chemi-
cally synthesized polypeptide), or analogous product . . . applicable 
to the prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of 
human beings.”21 Essentially, biologics are protein-based macro-
molecules that have been created by living cells.22 Biologics are not 
directly manufactured by humans; instead they are created by har-
nessing unique characteristics of certain specialized living cells.23 
These cells are genetically engineered through recombinant DNA 
technology to create a cell line that expresses or secretes the de-
sired protein-based molecules.24 A familiar example of a biologic is 
Humulin, which is an insulin used to control high blood sugar in 
adults and children with diabetes.25 
                                                                                                                            
19 See, e.g., Jenny M. Alsup, You Can Dance If You Want To? Initial Interpretations of the 
BPCIA’s Patent Dance with Sandoz and Amgen, 8 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 137, 138 
(2016). 
20 See Lu, supra note 12, at 617 (“A minor change in the manufacturing process, such as 
a minor change in temperature of cell culture, can change the overall characteristic of a 
final biologic product.”). 
21 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(1) (2012). 
22 See Lu, supra note 12, at 616–17. 
23 See Memorandum from the Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. to the Food & Drug 
Admin 4 (Nov. 12, 2004), https://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/04n0355/04n-
0355-c000004-01-vol1.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ETX-BXRR] [hereinafter Pharm. 
Memorandum]. 
24 Lu, supra note 12, at 616 n.15. 
25 About Humulin R U-500, HUMULIN, http://www.humulin.com/about-U-500.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/5YME-SJH8] (last visited Feb. 21, 2017). 
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Traditional small molecule drugs, are smaller, relatively simp-
ler, and man-made.26 Small-molecule drugs are synthesized with 
discrete, linear steps progressing in a predictable way, using pre-
scribed chemicals in a known formula.27 In contrast, biologics are 
larger and more complex, and their manufacturing process is less 
predictable and more complicated.28 A protein’s function is dic-
tated by its unique three-dimensional structure which is generated 
as the protein is being synthesized.29 In addition, many proteins 
within the cell require the placement of different types of mole-
cules, such as sugars or fatty acids, on specific regions to function 
properly.30 Thus, biologics, which are created through hundreds of 
thousands of interconnected chemical reactions in complex meta-
bolic pathways within a living cell, are very sensitive to environ-
mental perturbations.31 
The complex nature of biologics and the fact that they are pro-
duced within a living organism renders every component of the bi-
ologic important and indispensable.32 This is especially true regard-
ing the components of the manufacturing process of biologics be-
cause it is an extremely sensitive process and may be altered by any 
slight change.33 A slight alteration in a biologic’s manufacturing 
process can have a drastic effect on the final product, which may 
cause adverse clinical consequences.34 For example, a slight change 
in the cell expressing the desired protein can affect the way it ex-
                                                                                                                            
26 See Pharm. Memorandum, supra note 23, at 4. 
27 Id. at 3. 
28 Id. 
29 Elysa B. Goldberg, Note, Fixing a Hole: Will Generic Biologics Find a Niche Within the 
Hatch-Waxman Act?, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 327, 333 (2009). 
30 Id. 
31 Pharm. Memorandum, supra note 23, at 4. 
32 See id. at 4–5. 
33 See Erwin A. Blackstone & Joseph P. Fuhr, Jr., The Economics of Biosimilars, 6 AM. 
HEALTH & DRUG BENEFITS 469, 472 (2013) (“Biologics and biosimilars are sensitive to 
and altered by changes in their manufacturing process.”). 
34 Paul J. Declerck, Biotherapeutics in the Era of Biosimilars: What Really Matters Is 
Patient Safety, 30 DRUG SAFETY 1087, 1088 (2007) (“Small distinctions in the cell line, 
the manufacturing process or in any step from the cell line stage through to 
administration to the patient can make a major difference in adverse effects observed 
during treatment . . . .Therefore, unlike chemical pharmaceuticals, substitution between 
biologics, including [follow-on biologics], can have clinical consequences and create 
health concerns for patients.”). 
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presses that protein.35 Thus, unlike small molecule drugs, biologics 
are unique in that the “process is the product, and the product is 
the process.”36 
B. Patents on Biologics: Biologic Manufacturing Process as the 
Strongest Source of Patent Protection 
Due to the specific nature of biologics and its relationship with 
its manufacturing process, a patent on the manufacturing process is 
very important because the validity of a patent on the biologic itself 
is questionable under patent law. Patents are intended to “promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts”37 by granting property 
rights in information in exchange for full disclosure of the inven-
tion.38 A patent contains a specification and claims.39 The specifica-
tion is a narrative description of the invention,40 while the claims 
define the “metes and bounds” of the patent’s scope.41 A patent’s 
                                                                                                                            
35 Id.; Lu, supra note 12, at 625–26 (“Any minor change in the manufacture or drug-
delivery process can change the overall characteristic of a final biologic product. For 
example, with exactly the same manufacturing process, a manufacturer of interferon beta-
1a produced two batches of products with drastically different immunogenicity. One 
batch was safe and effective, yet another batch caused serious immune responses. The 
only difference between the two batches was the manufacture site. The manufacturing 
conditions that affect the properties of biologics generally include: the cell lines used to 
produce the biologics, culture/fermentation conditions, purification procedures, and 
container closure/packaging systems. Thus, a much higher quality control standard is 
required for biologics than for small molecule drugs.”). 
36 Tam, supra note 7, at 543. 
37 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
38 See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 621 
(Fed. Cir. 2000), vacated, 535 U.S. 722 (2002) (“To obtain this exclusive right, the 
inventor must disclose his invention to the public. Thus, the patent also is of value to the 
public because such disclosures will stimulate others to add to the sum of human 
knowledge through the creation of other inventions utilizing the lessons learned by the 
patentee.”); see also Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (“The 
patent monopoly was not designed to secure to the inventor his natural right in his 
discoveries. Rather, it was a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge.”); 
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause 
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that 
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public 
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”). 
39 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012). 
40 See id. 
41 See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997) 
(describing the boundary of a patent as its “metes and bounds”); Festo, 234 F.3d at 622 
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claims give third parties notice of the existence of the invention and 
the location of the boundaries,42 but may also be used by competi-
tors as a guide to designing around the patent.43 Thus, the precise 
understanding of a patent’s claims is essential to what the patent 
actually protects and in determining whether a patent has been in-
fringed upon. 
There is a separate requirement for a patent to describe the in-
novation the patent seeks to protect.44 This requirement is “part of 
the quid pro quo of a patent; one describes an invention, and, if the 
law’s other requirements are met, one obtains a patent.”45 Among 
other things, the specification is required to enable any person 
skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly 
connected, to make or use the same innovation.46 If a person skilled 
in the art must engage in “undue experimentation” to make and 
use the patented invention, the patent may be found invalid for lack 
of enablement.47 Additionally, “patents that claim unreproducible 
                                                                                                                            
(“In drafting an original claim of a patent application, the writer sets out the metes and 
bounds of the invention . . . .”). 
42 PSC Comput. Prods., Inc. v. Foxconn Int’l, Inc., 355 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (“[C]laims serve the important notice function of informing the public that anyone 
who makes, uses, or sells the claimed invention infringes the patent.”). 
43 See, e.g., Read Corp. v. Porter, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 828 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“We have 
often noted that one of the benefits of the patent system is the incentive it provides for 
‘designing around’ patented inventions, thus creating new innovations.”). 
44 Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 1344. Section 112 of the Patent Act states, in relevant part: 
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, 
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, 
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the 
art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to 
make and use the same . . . . 
35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012). 
47 See, e.g., Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, 108 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 
1997) (quoting In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). Several underlying 
factual inquiries are made to determine whether the experimentation is undue or not. 
These include: 
(1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of 
direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of 
working examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state of the 
prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability 
or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth of the claims. 
In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
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or inoperable results are . . . invalid for lack of enablement, for oth-
ers skilled in the art cannot practice the invention.”48 Moreover, 
failing to enable others of ordinary skill in the art to verify that what 
they have made is identical to the claimed product, may invalidate 
the patent.49 Thus, both the claim and specification parts of a pa-
tent require a high-level of specificity regarding the innovation and 
are crucial to understanding what the patent protects and when it 
has been infringed upon. 
The complex nature of biologics and how they are created re-
veals that patents on biologics rest on “shaky ground”50 because 
the requirement to enable while simultaneously claim a biologic 
properly is paradoxical.51 First, the “enablement requirement 
presents a unique problem for inventions that involve living mate-
rials, such as biologics products,” because in many instances it is 
essentially impossible for a patent’s specification to provide an 
adequate account with the comprehensive taxonomic description 
necessary to enable  others to make and use the biological inven-
tion.52 This specific problem may be resolved by depositing a phys-
ical sample of the invention in the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office’s (“USPTO”) publicly accessible deposito-
ries.53 However, depositing samples in the USPTO depository does 
not completely resolve the enablement issue for biologics patents 
for the same reason why it is not plausible to create generic biolog-
ics, and why instead it is only plausible to create biosimilars.54 As 
discussed below, it is virtually impossible for a competitor to create 
a biologic that is identical to the innovator’s version.55 Theoretical-
ly, this should render most, if not all, patents on biologics invalid in 
the first place because the patent has not enabled a person skilled in 
the art to reproduce the claimed innovation at all, let alone without 
                                                                                                                            
48 Dmitry Karshtedt, Limits on Hard-to-Reproduce Inventions: Process Elements and 
Biotechnology’s Compliance with the Enablement Requirement, 3 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 
109, 111–12 (2011). 
49 Id. at 112–13. 
50 Tam, supra note 7, at 544. 
51 See generally id. at 545–47 (discussing the difficulty of meeting the enablement 
requirement for biologics). 
52 Id. at 545. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 See infra Section I.D. 
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undue experimentation.56 Thus, patents on biologics rest on 
“shaky ground.”57 
Biologics manufacturers anticipate that others may attempt to 
invalidate these seemingly questionable patents so that they can 
participate in the lucrative biologics industry.58 Therefore, for se-
curity, biologics manufacturers regularly obtain separate patents 
for the biologic and the manufacturing process of that biologic.59 
Properly tailored process patents could be a possible solution to the 
enablement problem.60 A biologic’s particular manufacturing 
process is indispensable in creating that specific biologic product 
without any variations.61 Any alteration or variation in that process 
will inevitably most likely produce a different biologic product.62 
Therefore, obtaining a patent on a biologic’s specific manufactur-
ing process effectively protects competitors from creating that bi-
ologic.63 Thus, an important source of patent protection for biolog-
ics may be the patents on the manufacturing process of that biolog-
ic.64 
Furthermore, the “product is the process”65 for biologics as 
even minor manufacturing changes may critically impact the final 
biologic product.66 Some, if not all, of the essential steps or tools 
that are necessary to manufacture the biologic are protected by 
                                                                                                                            
56 See generally Gregory N. Mandel, The Generic Biologics Debate: Industry’s Unintended 
Admission that Biotech Patents Fail Enablement, 11 VA. J.  L. & TECH., no. 8, 2006, at 21–25 
(discussing enablement law and how certain patents covering biologics will be invalid for 
lack of enablement, and suggesting that any chances in enablement law should be 
“narrowly limited”). 
57 See generally Tam, supra note 7, at 544–47. 
58 Id. at 546. 
59 Id.; see also Lu, supra note 12, at 624 (“Innovator companies often rely on method 
patents to protect the manufacturing process of the final products.”). 
60 Tam, supra note 7, at 546. 
61 See, e.g., Janet Freilich, Patent Infringement in the Context of Follow-on Biologics, 16 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 9, 21 (2012) (“[S]mall differences in production process—or even 
production by the same process but in a different facility—can result in differences in the 
product, which can have adverse clinical consequences.”). 
62 See id. 
63 See Tam, supra note 7, at 546. 
64 See id. 
65 Id. at 543. 
66 Donna M. Gitter, Innovators and Imitators: An Analysis of Proposed Legislation 
Implementing an Abbreviated Approval Pathway for Follow-on Biologics in the United States, 
35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 555, 561 (2008). 
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their own patents and other intellectual property methods.67 Thus, 
it would be virtually impossible to create this biologic without the 
ability to use the other steps or tools restricted by their own pa-
tent(s) because the process is integral for that specific biologic.68 
For example, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of 
America (“PhRMA”), a trade group that represents the country’s 
leading pharmaceutical research and biotechnology companies, 
stated that due to the “complexity of the biological manufacturing 
process, extensive analytical testing is done at key process steps 
using validated assays that are often proprietary, with appropriate 
sample qualification to ensure that the process intermediates are 
suitable for progressing to the next step.”69 Thus, the role of 
process patents on the manufacturing of biologics is crucial because 
it is key to manufacturing the biologic properly and may be the 
source of patent protection on the biologic itself. 
C. The Development, Federal Regulation, and Unaffordable Cost of 
Biologics 
There are strict regulations on the manufacturing and sale of 
biologics.70 Biologics are regulated under the Public Health Service 
Act (“PHSA”), which sets forth a strict process for approval.71 A 
successful biologic begins with the biologic manufacturer’s innova-
tion and can only enter the market after undergoing both research 
and development and clinical testing.72 The pre-clinical phase of 
development starts with experimentation and research, using in 
vitro (in glass) and in vivo (in cells) studies,73 to discover a clinical 
                                                                                                                            
67 See Freilich, supra note 61, at 20–21 (“[T]he details of the production process used 
by the pioneer company are protected by various intellectual property methods.”); Tam, 
supra note 7, at 546. 
68 See Freilich, supra note 61, at 20–21; Tam, supra note 7, at 546. 
69 See Pharm. Memorandum, supra note 23, at 4. 
70 See Public Health Service Act § 351, 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2012); Gitter, supra note 66, 
at 566; Goldberg, supra note 29, at 331–33 (discussing the various steps and tests that each 
innovator drug must undergo before being introduced to the public); Ernst R. Berndt et 
al., Opportunities for Improving the Drug Development Process: Results from a Survey of 
Industry and the FDA (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11425, 2005) 
(providing a brief overview of the approval pathway for pharmaceutical drugs). 
71 Public Health Service Act § 351. 
72 See Goldberg, supra note 29, at 331. 
73 See id. at 331–32; Berndt et al., supra note 70, at 7. 
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candidate compound.74 If researchers successfully identify and pu-
rify a clinical candidate compound, they will subsequently conduct 
animal studies for further testing.75 If the clinical candidate com-
pound obtains positive results from the animal studies, the compa-
ny developing the drug can file an Investigational New Drug 
(“IND”) application.76 The Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”) then evaluates the IND and decides whether or not to 
allow the drug to be tested on humans.77 If the FDA allows the drug 
to be tested on humans, then the clinical phases of testing, which 
consists of three mandatory, separate phases, begins.78 Each of 
these phases is designed to avert drugs that are not suitable for 
general public use.79 Phase I clinical trials test for “safety and tole-
rability” of the drug in a small group of human subjects.80 Phase II 
trials are conducted in a much larger pool of volunteers who are 
diagnosed with the particular targeted condition to continue testing 
for safety and tolerability, and to assess the preliminary effective-
ness of the drug.81 Phase III clinical trials are conducted on the 
largest pool of volunteers and are designed to evaluate the drug in a 
more diverse population over a longer period of time.82 The drugs 
that successfully complete these three phases can then be submit-
ted as new Biologic License Applications (“BLAs”) to the FDA.83 
The BLAs contain analytical, preclinical, and clinical data showing 
that the product is safe, pure, and potent as well as elaborate dis-
cussions of the methods by which the product is manufactured.84 
                                                                                                                            
74 A clinical candidate compound is a chemical that provides a key breakthrough for 
consequent clinical trials. See generally Franz F. Hefti, Requirements for a Lead Compound 
to Become a Clinical Candidate, 9 BMC NEUROSCIENCE, Dec. 10, 2008. 
75 Berndt et al., supra note 70, at 7. 
76 Gitter, supra note 66, at 565; Berndt et al., supra note 70, at 7. 
77 Gitter, supra note 66, at 565; Berndt et al., supra note 70, at 8. 
78 Gitter, supra note 66, at 565; Berndt et al., supra note 70, at 8. 
79 Gitter, supra note 66, at 565–66. 
80 Id. at 565; Berndt et al., supra note 70, at 8. 
81 Gitter, supra note 66, at 565–66; Berndt et al., supra note 70, at 8–9. 
82 Gitter, supra note 66, at 565–66; Berndt et al., supra note 70, at 9. 
83 42 U.S.C. § 262(A)(2) (2012); 21 C.F.R. § 601.2(a) (2016); Gitter, supra note 66, at 
566. 
84 § 262(A)(2)(C). 
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Thus, the unique nature of biologics, their complex manufac-
turing processes,85 and the strict approval procedures make them 
extraordinarily expensive to develop and bring to market.86 As of 
December 2012, the average cost of developing a new biologic was 
estimated to be approximately $1.9 billion.87 In addition, only ten 
percent of approved drugs are commercially successful, and it typi-
cally takes thirteen and a half years to receive approval to market a 
drug.88 Furthermore, between 2004 and 2010 only nine percent of 
the drugs that entered phase I clinical trials obtained approval, and 
only twenty-two percent of the biologics that reached phase II clin-
ical trials received approval.89 This expense is passed down to the 
consumer, thus making some of the most important biologics near-
ly unaffordable.90 The annual expense for the consumer of a biolog-
ic regimen may cost hundreds of thousands of dollars.91 
D. Generic Small-Molecule Drugs and the Hatch-Waxman Act: 
Biosimilars as a Solution to the Unaffordable Cost of Biologics 
The high costs of pharmaceuticals, including biologics, “put[s] 
a great burden on the financial stability of Americans.”92 The same 
                                                                                                                            
85 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS IN DEMONSTRATING 
BIOSIMILARITY TO A REFERENCE PRODUCT: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 5–6 (2015) (stating 
that “different cell line[s], raw materials, equipment, processes, process controls, and 
acceptance criteria” are all likely to affect the quality of produced biologics). 
86 See Grabowski, supra note 7, at 481–82 (providing an in-depth discussion of the 
unique characteristics of research and development activity and clinical testing that makes 
biologics more expensive); Lu, supra note 12, at 625 (“The cost to bring a biologic drug to 
the market is higher than that for a small-molecule drug. This higher cost is partly due to 
the high manufacture quality required in making a biologic.”). 
87 Blackstone & Fuhr, supra note 33, at 473. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 See Anthony D. So & Samuel L. Katz, Opinion, Biologics Boondoggle, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/08/opinion/08so.html [https:// 
perma.cc/3368-HHKD]. 
91 See, e.g., Blackstone & Fuhr, supra note 33, at 473 (“Herceptin can cost as much as 
$100,000 annually per patient and has sales of more than $6 billion.”); So & Katz, supra 
note 90 (“And those who take Cerezyme to treat Gaucher disease, a rare inherited 
enzyme deficiency, spend a staggering $200,000 a year.”). 
92 Felix Shin, Leaping from the “Patent Cliff” into the “Global Drug Gap”: Overcoming 
Exclusivity to Provide Affordable Biosimilars, 37 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 419, 443–
44 (2016) (calculating proportion of gross domestic product attributable to health 
expenditures, and comparing this to other countries). 
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problem of unaffordable medicine faced small-molecule drugs, 
which Congress resolved by enacting the Drug Price Competition 
and Patent Restoration Act of 1984,93 better known as the Hatch-
Waxman Act.94 By amending the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmet-
ic Act (“FDCA”), the Hatch-Waxman Act permitted pharmaceut-
ical companies to produce generic small-molecule drugs quicker 
and cheaper by permitting them to piggyback off of the data of 
brand-name drugs and bypass FDA testing.95 Under the Hatch-
Waxman Act, a generic small-molecule drug does not have to un-
dergo all of the aforementioned phases.96 Instead, the generic man-
ufacturer is only required to show that the generic drug: 
(1) contain[s] the same active ingredients as the 
[brand-name small-molecule drug] 
(2) [is] identical in strength, dosage form, and route 
of administration 
(3) [has] the same use indications 
(4) is bioequivalent97 [to the brand-name small-
molecule drug] 
(5) meet[s] the same batch requirements for identi-
ty, strength, purity, and quality 
(6) [is] manufactured under the same strict stan-
dards of FDA’s good manufacturing practice regula-
tions required for innovator products.98 
                                                                                                                            
93 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. & 35 U.S.C.). 
94 E.g., Matthew J. Seamon, Antitrust and the Biopharmaceutical Industry: Lessons from 
Hatch-Waxman and an Early Evaluation of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation 
Act of 2009, 34 NOVA L. REV. 629, 630 (2010). 
95 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012); Ralph A. Lewis, The Emerging Effects of the Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL. 361, 
362–63 (1984). 
96 See Lewis, supra note 95, at 362. 
97 § 355(j)(8)(B). Showing bioequivalence is essentially demonstrating that the generic 
drug acts the same way and has the same effect as the brand name drug. See H.R. REP. 
NO. 98-857, at 31 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N 2647, 2664 (“A drug shall be 
considered bioequivalent to a listed drug if the rate and extent of absorption of the generic 
drug do not show a significant difference from the rate and extent of absorption of the 
listed drug . . . .”); CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: BIOAVAILABILITY AND BIOEQUIVALENCE STUDIES SUBMITTED 
IN NDAS OR INDS—GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 2 n.4 (2014) (describing 
“bioequivalence” as a statutory term under the FDCA). 
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This abbreviated scheme allowed by the Hatch-Waxman Act 
cuts costs and allows for cheaper generic alternatives to be intro-
duced into the market.99 In 2009, generic non-biological drug ap-
plications typically took three to five years to assemble at a corres-
ponding cost of $1 million to $5 million.100 The Hatch-Waxman 
Act also permits consumers to choose between brand-name and 
generic drugs earlier, driving down the cost of drugs by price com-
petition.101 Overall, the Hatch-Waxman Act is generally considered 
to be a success and, as a result, small-molecule drugs are relatively 
more affordable.102 However, the generics solution is not directly 
available for biologics.103 
Indeed, it is effectively impossible to create a generic biolog-
ic.104 The generic scheme works for small-molecule drugs because 
the brand-name companies have already proven that the molecule 
is effective.105 Thus, as long as the generic companies are making a 
drug that has the identical active ingredient and is bioequivalent, 
then the generic can be presumed to be effective without the need 
for extensive clinical trials. However, the physical nature of biolog-
ics and biological manufacturing renders it virtually impossible to 
achieve identical composition between biologics produced by unre-
lated manufacturers.106 While the manufacturing process for a 
                                                                                                                            
98 Generic Drugs: Questions and Answers, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/ 
Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/QuestionsAnswers/ucm100100.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/3CT4-QFXV] (last visited Feb. 22, 2017). 
99 Martha M. Rumore, The Hatch-Waxman Act—25 Years Later: Keeping the 
Pharmaceutical Scales Balanced, PHARMACY TIMES (Aug. 15, 2009), http://www. 
pharmacytimes.com/publications/supplement/2009/genericsupplement0809/generic-
hatchwaxman-0809 [https://perma.cc/ZG3L-VLMA]. 
100 FED. TRADE COMM’N, EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC 
DRUG COMPETITION iii (2009). 
101 Id. at ii. 
102 See Jason Kanter & Robin Feldman, Understanding and Incentivizing Biosimilars, 64 
HASTINGS L.J. 57, 62 (2012) (“The Hatch-Waxman Act has been relatively successful in 
creating a system that is well defined for investors, incentivizing both new drug 
development and generic entry.”); Sara Margolis, Note, Destined for Failure? An Analysis 
of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
209, 222–23 (“The Hatch-Waxman Act has had significant success in lowering the prices 
of pharmaceutical drugs.”); Rumore, supra note 99. 
103 See Kanter & Feldman, supra note 102, at 59. 
104 See Pharm. Memorandum, supra note 23, at 4. 
105 See Generic Drugs: Questions and Answers, supra note 98. 
106 Pharm. Memorandum, supra note 23, at 4. 
2017] RIDDLE OF THE MYSTERIOUS PATENT DANCE 661 
 
small-molecule drug product typically involves only “several dozen 
discrete, linear steps progressing” in a controlled and predictable 
way, the “manufacturing processes for biologics are based on the 
synthetic capabilities of living cells that have inherent metabolic 
and synthetic variability.”107 As PhRMA explained: “Using a living 
organism to produce a biological product involves hundreds to 
thousands of interconnected steps in complex metabolic pathways 
which are very sensitive to environmental perturbations.”108 Each 
biologic manufacturing process results in a unique product where 
even small alterations may cause considerable differences in the 
clinical properties of the resulting biological product.109 PhRMA 
asserted that “[c]hemically and pharmaceutically identical biolog-
ics will not result from unrelated manufacturers.”110 Instead, it is 
possible to create biologics that are “highly similar” to each other 
in that they have “no clinically meaningful differences in terms of 
safety and effectiveness.”111 These macromolecules are highly 
similar, but not exact—hence, the name biosimilar.112 A biosimilar 
is “highly similar” to a biologic, which is referred to as the “refer-
ence product.”113 
Therefore, replicating the Hatch-Waxman system for biologics 
was initially believed to be impossible.114 However, in 2009, Con-
                                                                                                                            
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id.; see also Michal Nowicki, Basic Facts About Biosimilars, 30 KIDNEY BLOOD 
PRESSURE RES. 267, 268 (2007). 
110 Pharm. Memorandum, supra note 23, at 4. 
111 Information for Consumers (Biosimilars), FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,  https://www. 
fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/ 
ApprovalApplications/TherapeuticBiologicApplications/Biosimilars/ucm241718.htm 
[https://perma.cc/L872-ZPLT] (last visited Feb. 23, 2017); see also Kanter & Feldman, 
supra note 102, at 59 (“[T]he term ‘generic’ does not currently apply to biological drugs 
copied from an original biologic. Rather, such copies are referred to as biosimilars, or 
follow-on biologics.”). 
112 Kanter & Feldman, supra note 102, at 59. 
113 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(2)(A), (i)(4) (2012). 
114 See Krista Hessler Carver et al., An Unofficial Legislative History of the Biologics Price 
Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 671, 711–16 (2010); see also 
Declerck, supra note 34, at 1089 (“As a consequence of the complexity of both the 
biotechnology product and the production process . . . and the limitation of sensitivity of 
analytical tools (i.e. the process determines the product), no solid scientific grounds exist 
to guarantee safe interchangeability between any biologics . . . obtained through different 
manufacturers.”). 
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gress enacted the BPCIA, a subtitle within the larger Patient Pro-
tection and Affordable Care Act, which provided a streamlined 
process for biosimilar approval.115 
E. BPCIA 
The BPCIA seeks to ensure that the biosimilars are held to a 
strict and safe standard by defining a biosimilar to mean: “(A) that 
the biological product is highly similar to the reference product 
notwithstanding minor differences in clinically inactive compo-
nents; and (B) there are no clinically meaningful differences be-
tween the biological product and the reference product in terms of 
the safety, purity, and potency of the product.”116 The statute also 
requires that a biosimilar application—often referred to as “abbre-
viated biologic license application” (“aBLA”)117—fulfills strict da-
ta requirements.118 A biosimilar applicant must submit “analytical 
studies that demonstrate that the biological product is highly simi-
lar to the reference product notwithstanding minor differences in 
clinically inactive components,” “animal studies,” and clinical 
studies that are “sufficient to demonstrate safety, purity, and po-
tency in [one] or more appropriate conditions of use . . . .”119 The 
biosimilar applicant is also required to show that its biological 
product uses “the same mechanism[s] of action” as the reference 
product and that “the route of administration, the dosage form, 
and the strength of the biological product are the same as those of 
the reference product.”120 Additionally, the biosimilar applicant 
must demonstrate in its aBLA that “the condition or conditions of 
use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling pro-
posed for the biological product have been previously approved for 
                                                                                                                            
115 The key provisions of the BPCIA are codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2012). 
116 § 262(i)(2). 
117 Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[U]nder the 
abbreviated pathway created by the BPCIA, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262(k), an applicant 
filing an abbreviated biologics license application (‘aBLA’ or ‘subsection (k) application’) 
instead submits information to demonstrate that its product is ‘biosimilar’ to or 
‘interchangeable’ with a previously approved reference product.” (quoting 42 U.S.C. 
§ 262(k)(2)–(5) (2012))), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 808 (2017); Lu, supra note 12, at 614. 
118 See § 262(k)(2). 
119 § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(I). 
120 § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(II), (IV). 
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the reference product.”121 Furthermore, the biosimilar applicant 
must demonstrate that the facility in which their biological product 
is produced “meets standards designed to assure that the biological 
product continues to be safe, pure, and potent.”122 If the biosimilar 
applicant meets all of these requirements, as well as packaging and 
labeling requirements, then the biological product may be deemed 
biosimilar to the reference product.123 The BPCIA states that when 
a biological product “(i) is biosimilar to the reference product; and 
(ii) can be expected to produce the same clinical results as the ref-
erence product in any given patient . . .”124 it may be deemed “in-
terchangeable” with the reference product and be substituted for 
the brand name biologic by a pharmacist, even if the physician did 
not prescribe the biosimilar.125 
Like the Hatch-Waxman Act, the BPCIA encourages generic 
competition by allowing biosimilar manufacturers to piggyback off 
of the clinical data of the reference biologic.126 In contrast to the 
approximately $1.9 billion and thirteen and a half years it typically 
takes to fully develop a biologic, it takes only seven to eight years to 
develop a biosimilar at a relatively reasonable cost of $100 to $250 
million.127 Additionally, “biosimilars have a better chance to make 
it to market and are therefore less risky than branded biologics” 
because it is easier and cheaper to copy than to innovate.128 This 
allows biosimilar manufactures to enter the market at a significantly 
cheaper price and thus introduce competition, making treatments 
significantly more affordable.129 
                                                                                                                            
121 § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(III). 
122 § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(V). 
123 § 262(i)(2), (k). 
124 § 262(k)(4)(A). 
125 § 262(i)(3); Information for Consumers (Biosimilars), supra note 111. 
126 Epstein, supra note 16, at 287; see Alsup, supra note 19, at 138–39 (“The [BPCIA] 
regulates the approval of biosimilars. Borrowing from the Hatch-Waxman Act, the 
BPCIA lays out an abbreviated pathway to FDA approval and market entry.”); Lu, supra 
note 12, at 614–15. But see Margolis, supra note 102, at 222–36 (arguing that the BPCIA 
will not succeed in lowering drug prices to the same degree that the Hatch-Waxman Act 
did for generic pharmaceuticals). 
127 See Blackstone & Fuhr, supra note 33, at 471, 473. 
128 Id. at 473. 
129 See Jacqueline T. Genovese, Note, Biosimilar Naming: A Call for Uniformity in a 
Complex Field, 41 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 293, 303 (2015) (“Essentially, the BPCIA creates a 
shorter pathway for biosimilar approval, which in turn allows for cheaper alternatives to 
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The BPCIA has many complex and interconnected aspects.130 
One of the central aspects131 is a process in which the original bi-
ologic manufacturer (the “reference product sponsor” or “RPS”) 
and biosimilar applicant exchange patents that they believe need to 
be litigated.132 This patent exchange is an elaborate back-and-forth 
process and has thus been dubbed the “patent dance” by practi-
tioners.133 The first step of this procedure requires the biosimilar 
applicant to provide the RPS access to the biosimilar application 
itself and “such other information that describes the process or 
processes used to manufacture the biological product” described in 
the application “[n]ot later than [twenty] days after the Secre-
tary134 notifies the [biosimilar] applicant that the application has 
been accepted for review.”135 In addition, the applicant may in its 
own discretion supply additional information that the RPS re-
quests.136 In the next stage of the process, the RPS must give the 
biosimilar applicant a list of patents for which it “believes a claim 
of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted” against the 
biosimilar applicant within sixty days of receiving the application 
and information.137 This list of patents includes process patents, 
unlike the Hatch-Waxman Act’s litigation provisions, which ex-
clude process patents.138 Once this is done, the dance turns to the 
                                                                                                                            
many life-saving biologic medicines.”). But see Erika Lietzan, The Myths of Data 
Exclusivity, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 91, 107–10 (2016) (discussing how much cost 
savings biosimilars will actually provide). 
130 Carl J. Minniti III, Sandoz v. Amgen: Why Current Interpretation of the Biologic Price 
Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 Is Flawed and Jeopardizes Future Competition, 97 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 172, 177 (2015) (“The BPCIA is undoubtedly a complex 
statute.”). 
131 Id. at 178 (“The central feature of the BPCIA is the [p]atent [d]ance.”). 
132 Lindsay Kelly, Biologics in the Practice of Law, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 25 
(2016). 
133 Id. (“The BPCIA ‘patent dance,’ as it is colloquially referred to by patent 
lawyers . . . .”). 
134 42 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2012) (“Unless the context otherwise requires, the term 
“Secretary” means the Secretary of Health and Human Services.”). 
135 Id. § 262(l)(2)(A). 
136 § 262(l)(2)(B). 
137 § 262(l)(3)(A)(i). 
138 See Michael P. Dougherty, The New Follow-on-Biologics Law: A Section by Section 
Analysis of the Patent Litigation Provisions in the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation 
Act of 2009, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 231, 234 (2010) (“The scope of the patents to be 
identified in this process is broader than under the Hatch-Waxman Act, embracing not 
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biosimilar applicant who may, but need not, supply a list of addi-
tional patents that it believes could be the basis for a reasonable 
claim against its biosimilar.139 Either way, the biosimilar applicant 
must provide a “detailed statement” that explains why any patent 
listed (by either side) is “invalid, unenforceable, or will not be in-
fringed.”140 Alternatively, the biosimilar applicant may signal a 
truce with respect to any particular patent by providing a statement 
to the reference product sponsor that it “does not intend to begin 
commercial marketing of the biological product before the date that 
such patent expires.”141 The BPCIA also makes the submission of 
the biosimilar application an artificial act of infringement with re-
spect to any patent identified by either party in this list exchange 
process.142 This creates federal court jurisdiction for the resolution 
of the patent litigation that will ultimately follow.143 
Once the biosimilar applicant has sent its statement regarding 
patent validity, enforcement, and infringement, the BPCIA pro-
vides a road map for litigation of the resulting patent issues.144 In 
brief, the parties identify a set of patents to be litigated immediate-
ly, leaving the rest for litigation shortly before biosimilar market 
entry.145 If the RPS prevails before the end of the twelve-year exclu-
sivity period146 on any patent in the first wave of litigation, the 
                                                                                                                            
only patents claiming the biological product and methods of using it, but also patents 
relevant to the product’s manufacturing process.”). Compare § 262(l)(3)(A)(i) (referring 
to “a list of patents for which the reference product sponsor believes a claim of patent 
infringement could reasonably be asserted”), with 21 U.S.C. 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2012) 
(requiring a generic applicant under Hatch-Waxman Act to file a certification with 
respect to “each patent which claims the listed drug . . . or which claims a use for such 
listed drug for which the applicant is seeking approval . . .”). As explained below, the 
process of manufacturing a biologic is crucial to the actual product and may be the sole 
source of intellectual property protection. See infra Section II.A. 
139 § 262(l)(3)(B)(i). 
140 § 262(l)(3)(B)(ii)(I). 
141 § 262(l)(3)(B)(ii)(II). 
142 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(C) (2012). 
143 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2012); Alsup, supra note 19, at 141 (“This act of infringement is 
considered artificial and like its counterpart under the Hatch-Waxman Act, it enables an 
earlier adjudication of patent disputes and creates a justiciable case or controversy.”). 
144 See § 262 (l)(4)–(6). 
145 See id; Dougherty, supra note 138, at 237–38. 
146 See 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A) (2012) (“Approval of an application under this 
subsection may not be made effective by the Secretary until the date that is [twelve] years 
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BPCIA requires the court to enjoin infringement until the patent 
expires.147 In an article discussing the BPCIA in relation to the con-
stitutional protection of trade secrets and patents, Professor Ri-
chard Epstein predicted that “[w]here that statutory injunction 
provision does not apply,” the RPS will “presumably seek an in-
junction,” and damages, “if the biosimilar has been approved and 
marketed.”148 
F. Amgen v. Sandoz 
In one of the first instances of the application of the BPCIA, the 
biosimilar applicant refused to initiate the patent dance. In 1991, 
the FDA approved Amgen, Inc.’s biologic filgrastim under the 
trade name Neupogen to reduce the risk of infection in patients 
undergoing chemotherapy.149 Sandoz, Inc. developed its own fil-
grastim product, a close copy of Neupogen called EP2006, under 
the trade names Zarzio and Zarxio.150 Sandoz began marketing Zar-
zio outside the United States in 2009, and launched Zarxio in the 
United States in September 2015.151 
On July 7, 2014, Sandoz received notice that the FDA accepted 
its application for Zarzio, making it the first ever application for a 
biosimilar to be accepted by the FDA.152 As stated above, the first 
                                                                                                                            
after the date on which the reference product was first licensed under subsection (a).”); 
Dougherty, supra note 138, at 233 n.14. 
147 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(D) (2012). 
148 Epstein, supra note 16, at 318. 
149 Andrew Pollack, An F.D.A. Approval for Amgen, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 1991), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/1991/02/22/business/an-fda-approval-for-amgen.html [https:// 
perma.cc/QB4Y-FZQN]. 
150 Press Release, Novartis, Sandoz Launches Zarxio (Filgrastim-Sndz), the First 
Biosimilar in the United States, NOVARTIS (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.novartis.com/ 
news/media-releases/sandoz-launches-zarxiotm-filgrastim-sndz-first-biosimilar-united-
states [https://perma.cc/C5SJ-VP4V]; see also Press Release, Sandoz, Zarzio Overtakes 
Neupogen and Granocyte to Become Most Prescribed Daily G-CSF in Europe (July 22, 
2013), http://www.evaluategroup.com/Universal/View.aspx?type=Story&id=444283 
[https://perma.cc/N5JL-8CKT]; Sabrina Tavernise, For First Time, F.D.A. Panel 
Approves Generic Copy of Costly Biologic Drug, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2015), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2015/01/08/science/fda-panel-vote-biologics.html [https://perma.cc/ 
G42K-BPY6]. 
151 Press Release, Novartis, supra note 150; Tavernise, supra note 150. 
152 See Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., No. 14-CV-04741-RS, 2015 WL 1264756, at *1, *3 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2015) aff’d in part, vacated in part, 794 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015), 
cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 808 (2017); Tavernise supra note 150. 
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step of the patent dance is to supply the stipulated information no 
later than twenty days after the “Secretary notifies the [biosimilar] 
applicant that the application has been accepted for review.”153 
However, Sandoz chose not to comply with the BPCIA’s disclo-
sure and negotiation procedures, taking the position that initiating 
the patent dance is optional.154 Sandoz proposed an alternative ar-
rangement—namely, that Amgen could “procure information via 
an infringement action.”155 Amgen brought suit in the Northern 
District of California on October 24, 2014.156 Nevertheless, on 
March 6, 2015, the FDA approved Sandoz’s filgrastim under the 
BPCIA, making it the first biosimilar approved and marketed in the 
United States.157 
On March 19, 2015, the district court sided with Sandoz on the 
patent dance issue, holding that the patent dance outlined by the 
BPCIA is optional and at the discretion of the biosimilar appli-
cant.158 Amgen appealed to the Federal Circuit, which issued a 
fractured decision on July 21, 2015.159 Two judges on the panel, 
Judges Lourie and Chen, found that the patent dance procedures 
under paragraph (l)(2)(A) of the BPCIA were optional and at the 
discretion of the biosimilar applicant, affirming the district court’s 
decision on this aspect and siding with Sandoz.160 
Ultimately, Sandoz filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with 
the Supreme Court on a related issue,161 and Amgen filed a condi-
tional cross-petition asking the Court to evaluate whether the pa-
                                                                                                                            
153 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)(A) (2012). 
154 Amgen, 2015 WL 1264756, at *3, *5. 
155 Id. at *3. 
156 Id. at *4. 
157 See Press Release, Novartis, supra note 150. 
158 Amgen, 2015 WL 1264756, at *6. 
159 Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. 
Ct. 808 (2017). 
160 Id. at 1357 (majority opinion); id. at 1367 (Chen, J., dissenting in part). But see id. at 
1362 (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting that he does not share in 
the court’s opinion, which includes the portion of the decision finding the biosimilar 
manufacture is required to disclose pursuant to paragraph (l)(2)(A)). 
161 Sandoz’s petition asked the Court to look at the issue of whether the clock on section 
262(l)(8)(A)’s commercial marketing notice requirement, which requires the biosimilar 
applicant to give the RPS 180 days’ notice, starts before or after FDA approves the 
biosimilar. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i–ii, Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., No. 15-
1039 (U.S. May 17, 2016). 
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tent dance was mandatory.162 On June 20, 2016, instead of deciding 
whether to grant certiorari on the patent dance dispute between 
Amgen and Sandoz, the Supreme Court invited the Solicitor Gen-
eral to file a brief in the case expressing the views of the United 
States.163 In response, the acting Solicitor General recommended 
that the court review the Federal Circuit’s decision because the 
questions presented are “sufficiently important to merit the 
Court’s review” and “[b]iologic medicines are among the most 
important pharmaceuticals available today.”164 On January 13, 
2017, the Supreme Court granted Sandoz’s petition and Amgen’s 
conditional cross-petition.165 The Supreme Court will hear argu-
ments in April 2017 and may issue a decision by the end of June.166 
It is imperative that the nature of the BPCIA’s patent dance is 
decided correctly. The pharmaceutical industry must make critical 
choices on where to allocate their spending and direct their re-
search and development of medicine that people desperately need. 
The decision on this issue will most likely influence how the phar-
maceutical companies make that determination. Thus, the decision 
will affect many. 
                                                                                                                            
162 Opposition to the Conditional Cross-Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Amgen 
Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., No. 15-1195 (U.S. May 17, 2016). 
163 Nathan Monroe-Yavneh & Aron Fischer, Supreme Court Asks Solicitor General to 
Weigh in on Amgen v. Sandoz, BIOLOGICS BLOG (June 20, 2016), http:// 
www.biologicsblog.com/blog/supreme-court-asks-solicitor-general-weigh-amgen-v-
sandoz/ [https://perma.cc/7RWP-63L8]. 
164 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 22, Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., Nos. 15-
1039, 15-1195 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2016); see also John T. Aquino, High Court Likely to Review 
Biosimilars Case After Solicitor General Brief, BNA: LIFE SCI. L. & INDUSTRY REP. (Dec. 9, 
2016), https://www.bna.com/high-court-likely-n73014448341/ [https://perma.cc/ 
9KWG-KD9C]. 
165 John T. Aquino, Supreme Court Grabs Chance to Clarify Biosimilar Law, BNA: LIFE 
SCI. L. & INDUSTRY REP. (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.bna.com/supreme-court-grabs-
n73014449884/ [https://perma.cc/4EW6-TBHR]. 
166 Id. 
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II. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION TO MAKE THE PATENT 
DANCE MANDATORY OR OPTIONAL 
Statutory interpretation may be used to analyze whether the pa-
tent dance was meant to be mandatory or optional,167 but that anal-
ysis is outside the scope of this Note. Instead, this Note discusses 
the purpose the patent dance purports to serve, and its role in the 
overall scheme of the BPCIA. This Part discusses several key im-
plications168 that result as a consequence of the patent dance being 
optional versus mandatory, and vice versa.169 Section II.A notes 
some of the implications that a mandatory or optional patent dance 
would have on patent infringement disputes and the effect it would 
have on the overall scheme of the BPCIA. Section II.B discusses 
how the decision of whether the patent dance is mandatory or op-
tional will determine whether the biosimilar applicants manufactur-
ing information is shared upfront or not. 
A. Consequences of the BPCIA Scheme and the Effect on Both Brand-
Name Biologics Manufacturers and Biosimilar Manufacturers 
If the patent dance is mandatory, then the sequence of events 
that follow an FDA approval of a biosimilar application is clear and 
predetermined: the biosimilar applicant must initiate and complete 
the strict patent dance process.170 However, if the patent dance is 
optional, then the sequence of events that follows the FDA approv-
al of a biosimilar application is more difficult to predict.171 Under 
the view that the patent dance is optional, the BPCIA allows two 
scenarios: “(1) the sharing of the biosimilar application and manu-
facturing information, in order to initiate the [p]atent [d]ance, or 
                                                                                                                            
167 See Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1354–59 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing 
and ultimately deciding this issue based on statutory interpretation), cert. granted, 137 S. 
Ct. 808 (2017). 
168 There are many important implications; however, this Note focuses on the 
implications that result from the effects that a mandatory or optional patent dance has on 
patent infringement disputes. 
169 The Federal Circuit’s decision focused on the statutory interpretation issues to 
determine whether the patent dance is optional or mandatory. It is true that there is a 
clear statutory interpretation question here, but this Note focuses on the policy choices 
based on the consequences of this important decision. 
170 See Carl J. Minniti III, Biosimilar Litigation: The Tussle Over How to Resolve Biologic 
Patents, 11 SCITECH LAWYER, no. 3, 2015, at 16, 17. 
171 See id. at 19. 
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(2) the refusal to share this information, thereby requiring the RPS 
to file an immediate declaratory judgment [law]suit” or resort to 
traditional patent infringement litigation.172 
Thus, a clear difference is immediately apparent: A mandatory 
patent dance ensures that the patent dance will occur and will be 
the method to resolve patent infringement disputes between the 
RPS and the biosimilar applicant. On the other hand, an optional 
patent dance creates a system in which the biosimilar applicant has 
the advantage of choosing how to proceed and may opt out of the 
patent dance entirely. The difference in these two systems creates 
several critical implications. 
1. Certainty for Both Brand Name Biologic and Biosimilar 
Manufacturers 
The first apparent implication involves the level of certainty. A 
system where the patent dance is mandatory enables the patent in-
fringement resolution process to be more certain and predictable 
for both brand name biologic and biosimilar manufacturers.173 Both 
parties would know that, when a biosimilar applicant gets a biosimi-
lar application approved, the next move is to follow the step-by-
step process of the patent dance; thus, both parties would be able 
to prepare accordingly.174 Although, in this system, neither party 
would seem to have any strategic advantage over the other, they 
both would have the benefit of knowing how the other party must 
conduct themselves.175 There may of course be specific facts and 
circumstances that make opting out of the patent dance the better 
                                                                                                                            
172 Id.; see also Alsup, supra note 19, at 154 (“These subparagraphs allow the reference 
product sponsor to commence patent litigation immediately following the wrong move, 
removing availability to the applicant of a litigation safe harbor.”). 
173 See Epstein, supra note 16, at 317 (“This brings certainty to the biosimilar applicants 
(indeed, a risk-free opportunity to determine whether they may market their products), 
but it also allows the innovator to avoid multi-year patent litigation proceedings while an 
infringing biosimilar product is eroding its market share.”). But see Kanter & Feldman, 
supra note 102, at 77 (discussing how the disclosure requirements of the patent dance are 
unclear). 
174 See Epstein, supra note 16, at 317–19 (outlining the patent dance and concluding that 
the statutory sequence “makes good sense”). 
175 See id. at 319 (“The whole point of the system is to induce rapid and reliable 
exchange of relevant information in order to reduce the various risks on both sides of the 
transaction.”). 
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option for a biosimilar manufacturer, as was the case for Sandoz in 
the case currently facing the Supreme Court;176 however, for bio-
similar manufacturers in general, a mandatory patent dance would 
provide certainty from the onset.177 This certainty could be a valua-
ble asset for biosimilar manufacturers who must make significant 
decisions on how to allocate their resources and how to market 
their products.178 
An optional patent dance, on the other hand, would create a 
system where there is significantly less certainty.179 In a system 
where the patent dance is optional, biosimilar manufacturers have 
two options and may choose to proceed with the option that best 
fits their current needs and circumstances.180 Even though there 
are only two options, the RPS would not have any way of knowing 
which option the biosimilar applicant will choose as it would pre-
sumably be dependent on private facts of the biosimilar manufac-
turer’s specific circumstances.181 
2. Strategic Options for the Biosimilar Applicant 
A second important implication concerns the strategic options 
available to the biosimilar applicant. If the patent dance was man-
datory, the biosimilar applicant would be required to initiate the 
patent dance within the twenty-day period.182 However, an option-
al patent dance would provide the biosimilar applicant with more 
advantageous strategic options.183 Under an optional regime, the 
biosimilar applicant may choose how they would like to proceed in 
a way that best fits their current needs and circumstances because 
the decision of whether to initiate the patent dance rests entirely in 
the hands of the biosimilar applicant.184 In other words, the biosi-
                                                                                                                            
176 Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. 
Ct. 808 (2017). 
177 See Epstein, supra note 16, at 317. 
178 See Amgen, 794 F.3d at 1363; WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL33901, FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
INNOVATION ISSUES 13 (2009); Epstein, supra note 16, at 317. 
179 See sources cited supra note 178. 
180 See Minniti, supra note 170, at 19. 
181 See id. 
182 See 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)(A) (2012). 
183 See Minniti, supra note 170, at 19. 
184 See id. 
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milar applicant would have the sole ability to decide how it wishes 
to proceed, and the RPS would simply have to wait until the end of 
the twenty-day period in which the BPCIA allows for the biosimilar 
applicant to provide the listed information and thus initiate the pa-
tent dance.185 The RPS would need to wait until the end of that pe-
riod to determine its next step.186 If the biosimilar applicant pro-
vides the RPS with the necessary information, then the patent 
dance initiates and the RPS would need to follow it.187 However, if 
the period lapses and the RPS has not received the prescribed in-
formation, then the RPS must file a patent infringement claim to 
protect the patents it believes the biosimilar applicant is infringing 
upon.188 
3. Comparing the Patent Dance to Traditional Patent 
Infringement Litigation 
Another critical implication stems from the difference between 
the patent dance and traditional patent infringement litigation.189 
Under a mandatory patent dance system, patent infringement dis-
putes between the RPS and the biosimilar applicant must be re-
solved through the patent dance.190 However, under an optional 
patent dance system where the biosimilar applicant has opted out 
of the patent dance, the RPS must rely on traditional patent in-
fringement litigation.191 One of the key distinctions between the 
patent dance and traditional patent infringement litigation is the 
efficiency of the patent dance over the potential expediency of an 
immediate patent infringement lawsuit.192 
                                                                                                                            
185 See id.; see also § 262(l)(2)(A). 
186 See § 262(l)(2)–(3) (showing that the RPS acts upon receipt of the biosimilar’s 
information); see also Minniti, supra note 170, at 19. 
187 See § 262(l)(3). 
188 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(C) (2012); see also Minniti, supra note 170, at 19. 
189 It is beyond the scope of this Note to explain every difference between the patent 
dance and traditional patent infringement litigation, so this Section instead focuses on the 
differences in the overall process with regard to manufacturing information. 
190 See Minniti, supra note 170, at 17. 
191 See § 271(e)(2)(C). 
192 See Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 14-CV-04741-RS, 2015 WL 1264756, at *6–7 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 19, 2015) (pointing out that section 262(l) “lays out a process that could take up 
to 230 days—just to commence patent litigation”), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 794 F.3d 
1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 808 (2017); Minniti, supra note 170, at 24–
25 (“Ultimately, the tension between biosimilar makers and reference product sponsors is 
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Complying with the patent dance establishes an efficient 
process in which patent disputes can be resolved.193 Once the pa-
tent dance is complete, the BPCIA requires the RPS and biosimilar 
application to engage in “good faith negotiations” regarding the 
disputed patents.194 The BPCIA forces both sides to compromise 
and agree on a list of specific patents to be litigated immediately.195 
The remaining patents can only be litigated later.196 This process is 
intended to guarantee that the patent infringement disputes will be 
resolved efficiently by ensuring that only the most pertinent pa-
tents are litigated immediately.197 Furthermore, the prescribed ne-
gotiation requires that both parties provide explanations for their 
actions at several points during the patent dance’s negotiation, 
creating transparency as to what the points of contention will be 
when the patents are ultimately litigated.198 
Additionally, the patent dance prescribes specific deadlines for 
each of its parts ensuring that the exchanges and negotiations run 
efficiently and that the actual litigation of the agreed upon patents 
occurs within a given time.199 The patent dances provides a more 
efficient process for the specific biologic and corresponding biosi-
milar because the patents that are necessary to determine how to 
proceed are identified early on.200 Although actual litigation may be 
delayed, relative to traditional patent litigation, both parties will 
                                                                                                                            
one of timing and disclosure. On the one hand, biosimilar makers want patent disputes 
resolved expediently to instill confidence in their investment, but do not want to share 
manufacturing information. On the other hand, reference product sponsors want patent 
disputes resolved methodically to delay the potential invalidation of their patents.”). 
193 See Dougherty, supra note 138, at 235–36 (providing a detailed analysis of the 
provisions comprising the patent dance). 
194 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(4)(A) (2012); Dougherty, supra note 138, at 237. 
195 See § 262(l)(4)(A); Dougherty, supra note 138, at 237–38 (“The patent resolution 
procedure begins with the applicant choosing a number of patents to be litigated. This 
step does not involve the identification of specific patents. Rather, it is only the 
applicant’s choice of how many patents should be litigated, e.g., one patent, two patents, 
etc. Within five days after the applicant chooses this number, the parties simultaneously 
exchange lists that identify the specific patents that each wants to litigate.”). 
196 See Kanter & Feldman, supra note 102, at 77 (“This process provides for initial 
litigation over essential patents and permits subsequent litigation or court action on the 
remaining patents only after resolution of that initial [law]suit.”). 
197 See id. at 77–78. 
198 See Dougherty, supra note 138, at 235–38. 
199 See § 262(l)(2)–(8) (providing a timeline for each step of the patent dance). 
200 See Kanter & Feldman, supra note 102, at 77. 
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know approximately when the litigation will occur201 and what it 
will encompass.202 This allows both parties to prepare accordingly, 
ensuring an overall efficient process.203 
This efficiency benefits both parties. The RPS benefits by liti-
gating the patents it deems the most pertinent and strongest first, 
and any other patents later.204 If the RPS wins at either of the stag-
es, it may be awarded an injunction.205 Thus, the patent dance 
grants the RPS an efficient method in which to deliver its strongest 
swipe at the biosimilar applicant, while guaranteeing that it can 
fight on the other patents (if applicable) should the RPS lose.206 In 
contrast, under traditional patent litigation, the RPS may need to 
fight all the patents at once.207 
The biosimilar applicant also benefits because the patent dance 
“allows the applicant to preview which patents the [RPS] believes 
are valid and infringed, assess related factual and legal support, and 
exercise some control over which patents are litigated and 
when.”208 Additionally, the biosimilar applicant has the benefit of 
being “able to undergo the [patent dance’s] information exchange 
while protected by the statute’s safe harbor from litigation.”209 A 
                                                                                                                            
201 Cf. § 262(l); Dougherty, supra note 138, at 235–39. Each step of the BPCIA’s patent 
dance provides a deadline; thus, litigation of the agreed upon patents must occur within 
the culmination of all of the deadlines. See Dougherty, supra note 138, at 235–39. 
202 See Dougherty, supra note 138, at 237–38. 
203 See Epstein, supra note 16, at 319 (“The whole point of the system is to induce rapid 
and reliable exchange of relevant information in order to reduce the various risks on both 
sides of the transaction.”). 
204 See Kanter & Feldman, supra note 102, at 77–78 (“The reference product sponsor 
must first provide a list of patents that it believes it can assert against the biosimilar 
applicant.”). But see Dougherty, supra note 138, at 237–38 (explaining that the biosimilar 
applicant chooses, and the RPS must comply with, the number of patents to litigate if the 
parties do not agree on which patents should be litigated). 
205 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4) (2012); Dougherty, supra note 138, at 234. 
206 See Epstein, supra note 16, at 318. 
207 See Alsup, supra note 19, at 143–44 (“Paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of subsection (l) 
establish a two-phase litigation process that represents a radical departure from traditional 
patent litigation.”). 
208 Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 14-CV-04741-RS, 2015 WL 1264756, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 19, 2015), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 794 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 
137 S. Ct. 808 (2017). 
209 Id. But see Alsup, supra note 19, at 154 (“These subparagraphs allow the reference 
product sponsor to commence patent litigation immediately following the wrong move, 
removing availability to the applicant of a litigation safe harbor.”). 
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biosimilar applicant with a high or unknown risk of liability for in-
fringement may find this “carrot of a safe harbor”210 particularly 
advantageous because, otherwise, the applicant would remain vul-
nerable to risky patent infringement lawsuits.211 And, if necessary, 
the biosimilar applicant could “delay its product launch to protect 
the investment it made in developing its biosimilar.”212 
However, the efficiency of the patent dance comes at the cost 
of time and expediency. The process could take up to 230 days to 
commence patent litigation.213 Comparatively, traditional patent 
infringement does not entail the same pre-ligation negotiations or 
communications and thus can provide a potentially more expedient 
process.214 To some, this expediency may be more valuable than 
the efficiency delays provided by the patent dance.215 For example, 
the efficiency of the patent dance may be outweighed by the disad-
vantage of unnecessary delay to a biosimilar “applicant who values 
expedience over risk mitigation.”216 A biosimilar applicant may 
confidently believe in good faith that there are no relevant unex-
pired patents that its biosimilar infringe upon, and “that it is likely 
to prevail if challenged with an infringement [claim].”217 The ap-
plicant may, in such an instance, wish to waive the efficiency and 
benefits that the patent dance provides, “and instead commence 
litigation immediately.”218 
Thus, the potential for expediency that an optional patent 
dance provides may be a tremendous benefit to the biosimilar ap-
plicant in certain circumstances. The only apparent benefit the 
RPS would gain under an optional patent dance regime is the lack 
of strict restrictions and constraints that the patent dance would 
have instigated, such as the safe harbor.219 
                                                                                                                            
210 Amgen, 2015 WL 1264756, at *6. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. at *7. 
214 See id. at *6–7 (noting that Sandoz’s decision not to comply with the patent dance 
led Amgen to file a patent infringement lawsuit sooner than if it had complied with the 
patent dance). 
215 See id. 
216 Id. at *7. 
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at *6; Alsup, supra note 19, at 154. 
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B. Implications of Sharing the Biosimilar Applicant’s Application and 
Manufacturing Information 
Another crucial implication of the decision to make the patent 
dance mandatory or option is that, under the patent dance, the bio-
similar applicant is required to share information that would not be 
shared in traditional patent infringement lawsuits.220 Under the 
first step of the patent dance, the biosimilar applicant must share a 
copy of the application with the RPS.221 If the biosimilar applicant 
decided to opt out of the patent dance, it would not be obligated to 
disclose that information, and the RPS may be entirely unaware of 
the application because the FDA cannot disclose filings.222 The 
first step of the patent dance also requires the biosimilar applicant 
to share information regarding the manufacturing processes of the 
biosimilar.223 This unique aspect of the patent dance,224 if adhered 
to, ensures that the RPS will know potential trade secret informa-
tion regarding the process, or processes, used to manufacture the 
biosimilar in question.225 Comparatively, under traditional patent 
infringement litigation, there is no requirement for a party to share 
this information.226 Thus, the information-sharing steps of the pa-
tent dance give the RPS a significant advantage because it can use 
the information provided to determine whether the biosimilar ap-
plicant infringes on any RPS manufacturing patents issued for its 
original biologic.227 
                                                                                                                            
220 The biosimilar applicant must share a copy of the application that it submitted to the 
FDA. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)(A) (2012). The biosimilar applicant must also share 
“such other information that describes the process or processes used to manufacture the 
biological product that is the subject of such application.” Id. 
221 Id. 
222 See Epstein, supra note 16, at 289–90; Minniti, supra note 170, at 19 (“Moreover, 
because FDA cannot disclose subsection (k) filings, the RPS could be placed in the 
difficult position of not even knowing an application has been filed for a drug that could 
undercut its sales, if the biosimilar applicant does not disclose that information.”). 
223 § 262(l)(2)(A). 
224 See Dougherty, supra note 138, at 234 (“The scope of the patents to be identified in 
this process is broader than under the Hatch-Waxman Act, embracing not only patents 
claiming the biological product and methods of using it, but also patents relevant to the 
product’s manufacturing process.”). 
225 Epstein, supra note 16, at 317. 
226 See id. at 319; Minniti, supra note 170, at 19. 
227 See Minniti, supra note 170, at 19 (“Under the [patent dance], the biosimilar 
applicant must provide a copy of its application and manufacturing process information to 
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To adequately plead a claim of patent infringement, a patent 
holder must state plausible factual allegations based on information 
that is sufficient to state a claim that a product infringes its pa-
tent.228 Competitors rarely have access to each other’s confidential 
manufacturing processes before litigation.229 If the biosimilar appli-
cant does not share its manufacturing information with the RPS, 
then litigation of the process patents on the method of manufactur-
ing its biologic is significantly more complicated because the RPS 
typically has no way of knowing the methods that the biosimilar 
applicant uses to manufacture the biosimilar.230 The RPS will typi-
cally “not be privy to the manufacturing processes used by the bio-
similar applicant and[,] therefore, may be unable to determine 
whether any of its manufacturing patents are infringed.”231 Thus, it 
would be significantly more difficult for a RPS to sufficiently state a 
claim, based on plausible factual allegations, that the biosimilar ap-
plicant infringes on its process patents.232 Additionally, the patent 
holder itself assumes the risk that it will be challenged on validity 
grounds each time it enters litigation because there is no guarantee 
that a patent will be found to be valid.233 Therefore, if there is no 
probable patent infringement, the patent holder would likely not 
want to litigate due to the risk that the patent may be invalidated.234 
If the RPS does not have information about manufacturing, it 
                                                                                                                            
the RPS, enabling the RPS to assess whether its patents may be infringed by commercial 
marketing of the biosimilar.”). 
228 See In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Patent Litig., 681 F.3d 1323, 
1331 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)) (discussing 
pleading standard to survive a motion to dismiss in the context of a patent litigation 
lawsuit). 
229 See Minniti, supra note 170, at 19. 
230 Id. 
231 Id. 
232 See supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
233 See Morton Int’l, Inc. v. Cardinal Chem. Co., 967 F.2d 1571, 1573 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 
1992) rev’d on other grounds, 508 U.S. 83 (1993) (“It is arguable that a counterclaim for 
invalidity of asserted claims is even mandatory . . . .”). 
234 See Roger A. Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 71, 
90–91 (2013) (“And patent holders are, of course, happy to collect licensing revenue and 
are likely willing to discount their royalties to avoid the risk of an invalidity judgment.”). 
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would not be able to make an accurate decision whether or not to 
enter litigation and risk the validity of its patent.235 
Ultimately, the RPS may find confidential “relevant product 
information” regarding the biosimilar applicant’s manufacturing 
processes through discovery.236 However, compiling sufficient fac-
tual matter to make a plausible claim can be—and usually is—very 
time-consuming and expensive.237 Moreover, it is possible that, de-
spite lengthy discovery, the patent holder may not actually find suf-
ficient information regarding the alleged infringing manufacturing 
process to be able to show a plausible claim of infringement, even 
though the process is in fact infringing on the patent.238 This may 
be especially true with biologics because of their complex, and not 
yet fully understood, nature and manufacturing process.239 As dis-
cussed above, the complex manufacturing process of biologics oc-
curs within a living cell, and therefore it may be nearly impossible 
to determine the specific manufacturing process that a competitor 
used to manufacture a biologic or biosimilar if the information is 
not shared.240 Thus, under an optional patent dance regime, bring-
ing a viable claim for the infringement of one or more of process 
patents may be complex and costly for the RPS. 
In contrast, under the patent dance’s procedures, all pertinent 
information must be shared.241 Therefore, the RPS will know 
whether the biosimilar applicant’s manufacturing process poten-
tially infringes its process patents, and it will be easier to show a 
                                                                                                                            
235 Some may argue that this point is not compelling on the basis that the RPS may not 
deserve much sympathy in this scenario because, if their patents are invalid, then there is 
no reason why they should be allowed to keep them. 
236 See Epstein, supra note 16, at 322. 
237 Attorneys’ View of Discovery Problems, 15 ALTS. TO HIGH COST LITIG. 132 (1997) (“A 
survey of attorneys released last month shows that discovery is expensive and full of 
problems—but attorneys seem to accept that as normal.”). 
238 See Minniti, supra note 170, at 19 (“[Under an optional patent dance regime and 
where the biosimilar applicant refuses to share the required information], the RPS will not 
be privy to the manufacturing processes used by the biosimilar applicant and therefore, 
may be unable to determine whether any of its manufacturing patents are infringed.”) 
239 See supra Section I.A. 
240 See Pharm Memorandum, supra note 23, at 6 (discussing how each manufacturer has 
different standards and tests, which are developed based on each product). 
241 See 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)(A) (2012). 
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plausible claim of infringement, if applicable.242 This divergence 
demonstrates a key difference, and thus consequence, between 
rendering the patent dance optional versus mandatory. If the pa-
tent dance is mandatory, then the path is clear: The biosimilar ap-
plicant must share information regarding its manufacturing process 
within twenty days of acceptance for review,243 ensuring that the 
RPS will ultimately know whether its manufacturing patents are 
being infringed or not. This cuts a large amount of time away from 
the patent litigation.244 On the other hand, if the patent dance is 
optional, the path forward can be complicated and expensive. 
III. THE PATENT DANCE SHOULD BE MANDATORY 
This Part weighs the aforementioned implications and con-
cludes that the patent dance of the BPCIA should be mandatory. 
Section III.A discusses the importance of the BPCIA’s aim to bal-
ance its countervailing goals of incentivizing innovation of new bi-
ologics while trying to make these biologics affordable. Section 
III.B then discusses how the implications outlined in Part II of this 
Note require a mandatory patent dance to ensure that the BPCIA’s 
balance is maintained. The Part concludes by arguing that the pa-
tent dance should be mandatory because the fundamental role of a 
biologic’s manufacturing processes requires that the manufacturing 
information be shared from the onset, which can only be ensured if 
the patent dance is mandatory. 
A. A Mandatory Patent Dance Is Essential to Maintaining the 
Balance of the BPCIA’s Goals 
The BPCIA lies at the intersection of two complex bodies of 
law: patent law and pharmaceutical regulation.245 Additionally, it 
walks the thin line between incentivizing innovation of new biolog-
ics while simultaneously trying to make these biologics afforda-
                                                                                                                            
242 See Minniti, supra note 170, at 19 (noting that in a mandatory patent dance regime, 
the RPS will be able to “assess whether its patents may be infringed”). 
243 § 262(l)(2)(A). 
244 Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 14-CV-04741-RS, 2015 WL 1264756, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 19, 2015), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 794 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 
137 S. Ct. 808 (2017). 
245 See Goldberg, supra note 29, at 352, 356; Tam, supra note 7, at 537–38, 564–65. 
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ble.246 These two goals are countervailing. If the process to allow 
biosimilars is too easy and favors the biosimilar manufacturers, the 
brand name biologics manufacturers may lose the incentive to allo-
cate their resources to innovation of new essential biologics.247 On 
the other hand, if the protection is too strong, and it is too difficult 
to bring competing biosimilars to the market, the BPCIA may fail 
to bring down prices as intended.248 
The legislative history shows that both biologic and biosimilar 
manufacturers were heavily involved in how the BPCIA was struc-
tured.249 It is clear that the final product was a negotiated compro-
mise that took both sides into account.250 The compromise recog-
nizes the complexity and difficulty of the countervailing goals that 
influenced the particular formation of the BPCIA as a whole.251 To 
combat that complexity, both parties compromised and agreed on a 
system that provides clarity and transparency so that the only re-
maining issue is the subject matter itself.252 Thus, all of the 
BPCIA’s components were presumably intended to execute that 
theme—each aspect of the BPCIA was intended to achieve com-
                                                                                                                            
246 See Epstein, supra note 16, at 286 (“This statute, like the Hatch-Waxman Act before 
it, is intended to balance twin goals that are necessarily in some tension.”); Lu, supra note 
12, at 650 (“[T]he central mission of the BPCIA is to balance two competing interests: 
innovation and accessibility.”); Tam, supra note 7, at 540 (“The resulting statute 
balances the interests of the pioneer drug industry, the generic drug industry, and patients 
seeking access to the best available medicines.”). 
247 John A. Vernon, Alan Bennett & Joseph H. Golec, Exploration of Potential Economics 
of Follow-on Biologics and Implications for Data Exclusivity Periods for Biologics, 16 B.U. J. 
SCI. & TECH. L. 55, 56 (2010) (“Inadequate incentives would likely diminish the 
economic attractiveness of undertaking new biotech [research and development] and 
investment in this sector.”). 
248 See Margolis, supra note 102, at 212–13. 
249 See Krista Hessler Carver et al., An Unofficial Legislative History of the Biologics Price 
Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 671, 816–18 (2010); Epstein, 
supra note 16, at 315 (“[T]he Biosimilars Act . . . was the subject of extensive four-year 
negotiations between the innovator and generic industry (both of which are sophisticated 
and well-informed).”). 
250 Carver et al., supra note 249, at 817 (“[T]he final decisions on key issues were the 
subject of bipartisan agreement and represented a middle ground between innovator and 
generic interests.”). 
251 Id. 
252 Id. at 776 (“[The Federal Trade Commission] added that [a] system of premarketing 
patent litigation that is simple and transparent is less likely to result in competitive 
harm.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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plete clarity and transparency to the furthest extent possible.253 It is 
this understanding that must inform the decision on every aspect of 
the BPCIA, including the patent dance. 
The implications outlined in Part II show that the patent dance 
must be mandatory. The efficiency and transparency that the pa-
tent dance ensures was a crucial aspect of the compromise and is 
essential to maintaining the BPCIA’s balance. Additionally, making 
the patent dance optional would significantly favor the biosimilar 
applicants, and these systematic implications would skew the bal-
ance and prevent the BPCIA from achieving its countervailing 
goals.254 Therefore, the patent dance should be mandatory. 
B. The Patent Dance Should Be Mandatory Because It Is Better for the 
BPCIA’s Purpose and Scheme 
As part of Congress’ efforts to balance the goals of competition 
and innovation, the BPCIA contains an extensive, integrated 
framework for the resolution of patent disputes between a biosimi-
lar applicant and an RPS.255 However, what Congress intended by 
including the patent dance and what its exact role was intended to 
be is disputed: Did Congress intend the patent dance to be an effi-
cient process or an expedient one? 
1. Efficiency Is the Key to the Patent Dance and Is Crucial to 
the BPCIA’s Balance 
The legislative history suggests that Congress intended the 
BPCIA to provide an efficient process in which biosimilars could be 
approved while maintaining a delicate balance.256 In a congressional 
hearing, Representative Anna Eshoo of California noted that the 
purpose of the patent dance was “to ensure that litigation sur-
rounding relevant patents will be resolved expeditiously and prior to 
the launch of the biosimilar product, providing certainty to the ap-
plicant, the reference product manufacturer, and the public at 
                                                                                                                            
253 See id. at 776, 817. 
254 See supra Section III.A. 
255 See 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(4)(A) (2012); see also Dougherty, supra note 138, at 237. 
256 See Minniti, supra note 130, at 184–85 (citing Biologics and Biosimilars: Balancing 
Incentives for Innovation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Competition Policy of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 196 (2009) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of 
Teresa Stanek Rea, President, American Intellectual Property Law Association)). 
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large.”257 Indeed, as Judge Newman of the Federal Circuit noted in 
his opinion in Amgen, one of the goals of the BPCIA was an “effi-
cient resolution of patent issues.”258 Additionally, in a brief sup-
porting Sandoz’s petition for certiorari, several biosimilar manufac-
turers explained: “To resolve such patent rights efficiently, subsec-
tion (l) of the statute, entitled ‘Patents,’ outlines a step-by-step 
process to determine when litigation as to particular patents may be 
filed.”259 However, Sandoz and the biosimilar industry seek to take 
it one step further by arguing that, essentially, the BPCIA gives 
them the option to choose the efficient “step-by-step process”260 
or opt out if expediency is more advantageous for their particular 
circumstances.261 Although the legislative history is silent on 
whether the BPCIA could allow the biosimilar applicant to choose 
how to proceed, it suggests that the patent dance was intended to 
ensure that an efficient process was utilized to resolve necessary 
patent infringement disputes.262 Therefore, the patent dance must 
be mandatory in order to maintain the scheme so that the balance is 
not skewed. 
The designated exchange of information is fundamental to the 
BPCIA’s purpose of efficient resolution of patent issues because 
the exchange was part of the compromise between the two sides, 
and it helps maintain the BPCIA’s balance of its countervailing 
                                                                                                                            
257 Hearing, supra note 256, at 9 (statement of Rep. Anna G. Eshoo) (emphasis added). 
At the time, Rep. Eshoo served on the House Energy and Commerce Committee and on 
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Id. at 7. She also co-chaired the 
Congressional High-Tech Caucus and the House Medical Technology Caucus, and 
served as Vice Chair of the 21st Century Health Care Caucus. Id. 
258 Amgen, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Newman, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 808 (2017). 
259 Brief for Hospira, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petition for Certiorari 
at 4, Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., No. No. 15–1039 (U.S. Jan 13, 2017) (No. 15-1039) 
(emphasis added). 
260 Id. 
261 See id.; Amgen, 794 F.3d at 1353; Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., No. 14-CV-04741-RS, 
2015 WL 1264756, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2015), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 794 F.3d 
1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 808 (2017) (“Sandoz sent Amgen a second 
letter on July 25 again offering conditional access to its BLA. It also asserted therein that 
the BPCIA entitled it to opt out of subsection (l )’s procedures, and that Amgen could 
instead procure information via an infringement action.”). 
262 See sources cited supra notes 256–57. 
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goals.263 The BPCIA, including the patent dance scheme, was the 
subject of lengthy negotiations.264 Thus, the BPCIA, as enacted, 
represents a compromise in which each aspect was intended to 
maintain the balance.265 It is “clear that a meaningful exchange of 
information is critical to both sides if they are to be able to litigate 
patent infringement issues before biosimilar market entry.”266 Al-
though there is debate as to whether patents increase innovation or 
not, it is generally accepted that for the pharmaceutical industry 
there would be no innovation if the pharmaceutical industry did not 
believe that their product had enough protection to be able to turn 
a profit.267 
As noted above, the cost to properly bring a drug to the market 
is astronomically expensive.268 Additionally, pharmaceutical indus-
tries must recoup losses sustained when certain drugs do not pass 
the research and development stage, or any of the FDA-required 
clinical phases, even though they have already expended millions, if 
not billions of dollars.269 It is clear that brand-name pharmaceutical 
manufacturers require patent protection to incentivize innova-
tion.270 Thus, for the BPCIA to succeed, it is imperative that nei-
                                                                                                                            
263 See Carver et al., supra note 249, at 816 (“[T]he nature of (and even advisability of) 
the patent litigation process [was] thoroughly debated years before enactment of the 
legislation.”). 
264 See id. (“[T]he BPCIA was enacted after many years of stakeholder discussions—
within the industry, at the agency, through citizen petition dockets, in journals, in 
legislative hearings, in markups, and on the Hill more generally—of, as far as the authors 
can tell, every key scientific and policy issue that needed to be addressed. Every provision 
of the final legislation—from the clinical trial requirements to the data exclusivity term—
had been publicly vetted for at least several years, and consensus on some points (such as 
the need for case by case determinations of the data requirements) had been evident for 
the better part of a decade.”); Epstein, supra note 16, at 315 (“[T]he Biosimilars Act . . . 
was the subject of extensive four-year negotiations between the innovator and generic 
industry (both of which are sophisticated and well-informed).”). 
265 Carver et al., supra note 249, at 817 (“[T]he BPCIA represented a meaningful 
compromise between biosimilar industry and innovator industry interests.”). 
266 Epstein, supra note 16, at 319. 
267 See Vernon et al., supra note 247, at 56. 
268 See supra notes 85–91 and accompanying text. 
269 See Grabowski, supra note 7, at 486. 
270 Gregory J. Glover, The Influence of Market Exclusivity on Drug Availability and 
Medical Innovations, AAPS J., Aug. 3, 2007, at E312, E315 (“The uncertainties associated 
with the development of pharmaceuticals are many and substantial. Maximizing the 
certainty that a research-based manufacturer can obtain, enforce, defend, and make full, 
legitimate use of IP rights is essential to maintaining the cycle of innovation for the benefit 
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ther side be allowed to unilaterally subvert the patent dance.271 The 
patent dance was structured to ensure an efficient process in which 
patent litigation can be deliberated early on.272 This efficiency is 
crucial for the BPCIA. As Richard Epstein explains in his article 
discussing the constitutional protection affected by the BPCIA, 
“[s]haring the information prescribed in the patent dance in confi-
dence gives the RPS an opportunity to voice its view about any po-
tential conflicts, at a point early enough in the process that the re-
mainder of the dispute can be resolved in an orderly fashion under 
the well-articulated statutory procedures.”273 
In this regard, and many others, complying with the patent 
dance is more efficient and effective than noncompliance. There 
may be times when it would be strategically advantageous for the 
biosimilar applicant to elect not to use the patent dance, but this 
complexity and lack of transparency is exactly what the BPCIA is 
trying to prevent.274 One of the countervailing goals of the BPCIA 
was to maintain the incentive to innovate.275 However, lengthy in-
tellectual property litigation and the increased uncertainty that an 
optional patent dance causes would negatively impact innova-
tion.276 
Additionally, as compared to the BPCIA, the Hatch-Waxman 
Act has a distinctly different process by which patent infringement 
disputes are resolved.277 The abbreviated pathway under the 
                                                                                                                            
of the public health. In the absence of strong IP rights at each stage of the innovation 
cycle, the promise of pharmaceutical innovation could be lost.”). 
271 See Epstein, supra note 16, at 319. 
272 42 U.S.C. § 242(l)(2) (2012); see Kanter & Feldman, supra note 102, at 77 (“This 
process provides for initial litigation over essential patents and permits subsequent 
litigation or court action on the remaining patents only after resolution of that initial 
[law]suit.”). 
273 Epstein, supra note 16, at 319; see also Dougherty, supra note 138, at 235–38. 
274 See Carver et al., supra note 249, at 776. 
275 Epstein, supra note 16, at 286. 
276 See Henry Grabowski et al., The Market for Follow-On Biologics: How Will it Evolve?, 
25 HEALTH AFF. 1291, 1300 (2006) (“[I]ncreased uncertainty and [intellectual property] 
litigation in biotech also would have major negative-incentive effects on capital market 
decisions for developing private and public biotech firms with promising pipelines.”). 
277 See Carver et al., supra note 249, at 815 (“In several respects, the patent provisions 
of the BPCIA represented a radical departure from those contained in the Hatch-Waxman 
amendments.”); Noel Courage & Ainslie Parsons, The Comparability Conundrum: 
Biosimilars in the United States, Europe and Canada, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 203, 215 (2011) 
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BPCIA differs greatly from that of generic small-molecule drugs 
prescribed by the Hatch-Waxman Act.278 The Hatch-Waxman Act 
requires the FDA to publish “a list”—known as the Orange 
Book279—and update it on a monthly basis.280 A manufacturer 
must then identify the numbers and expiration dates of the patents 
that cover its branded drug publicly in the Orange Book.281 In con-
trast, the BPCIA does not require the FDA to publish a list of li-
censed biological products, including applicable patent and non-
patent exclusivities,282 but instead provides the patent dance as the 
means in which patent disputes are resolved.283 The fact that the 
BPCIA contains such a different process demonstrates that it is a 
crucial aspect of the statute. Specifically, the statutory substitution 
shows—and the legislative history agrees—that the efficiency of 
the patent dance was part of this compromise between the two in-
dustries.284 Though the BPCIA is based on the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, it has “several obvious differences.”285 The fact that the pa-
tent dance intentionally departs from the Hatch-Waxman Act’s 
patent dispute process indicates that Congress believed that this 
new process was better for the BPCIA and biologics. 
                                                                                                                            
(“There are also very distinct differences in the patent litigation pathways under the 
BPCI Act and the Hatch-Waxman Act.”). 
278 Compare 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012), with 42 U.S.C. § 262(l) (2012). 
279 See Jacob S. Wharton, “Orange Book” Listing of Patents Under the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1027, 1032 (2003) (“When the FDA approves a [new drug 
application], the patent information submitted therewith is published in a publication 
entitled ‘Approved Drug Products With Therapeutic Equivalence,’ known in agency 
parlance as the ‘Orange Book.’” (citing Am. Bioscience, Inc. v. Thompson, 269 F.3d 
1077, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Terry G. Mahn, Patenting Drug Products: Anticipating Hatch-
Waxman Issues During the Claims Drafting Process, 54 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 245, 249–50 
(1999))). 
280 § 355(j)(7). 
281 § 355(b)(1)(G); see Wharton, supra note 279, at 1032. 
282 The “Lists of Licensed Biological Products with Reference Product Exclusivity and 
Biosimilarity or Interchangeability Evaluations, or “Purple Book,” which is modeled after 
the Hatch-Waxman’s Orange Book, is not required by the BPCIA. Kurt R. Karst, The 
“Purple Book” Makes Its Debut!, FDA L. BLOG (Sept. 9, 2014), http:// 
www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2014/09/the-purple-book-makes-its-
debut.html [https://perma.cc/38DS-VSHH]. The FDA decided to initiate the Purple 
Book as a reference guide, but it is still unclear how it will be used. Id. 
283 See § 262(1). 
284 See supra note 264. 
285 Amgen, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. 
Ct. 808 (2017); Lu, supra note 12, at 626. 
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The BPCIA’s patent provisions contain other radical depar-
tures from those contained in the Hatch-Waxman Act. Under the 
BPCIA, process patents, which may not be listed in the Orange 
Book, are addressed and may be asserted during litigation.286 Bring-
ing a lawsuit under the BPCIA does not stay approval of the biosi-
milar application, as occurs under the Hatch-Waxman Act, when a 
lawsuit is brought against the generic drug applicant in a timely fa-
shion.287 Similarly, there is no statutory bar on FDA approval even 
where the applicant indicates that it will wait until patent expira-
tion, or—in very limited circumstances—where the RPS wins the 
patent lawsuit.288 There also is no parallel in the BPCIA to the 180-
day exclusivity provided by the Hatch-Waxman amendments as an 
incentive to challenge or design around patents.289 Perhaps the 
most important departure from the patent litigation regime estab-
lished by the Hatch-Waxman amendments is the conduct of the 
litigation itself. Litigation under the Hatch-Waxman amendments 
is traditional patent litigation—patentees can assert any non-
process patents as to which a reasonable claim of infringement 
could be made.290 In contrast, the BPCIA operates to prevent pa-
tentees from asserting the relevant patents during the initial phase 
of litigation because the biosimilar applicant dictates how many pa-
tents can be asserted in the first instance.291 
The clearly purposeful decision to depart from the Hatch-
Waxman Act’s method of resolving patent disputes shows that 
Congress believed that the efficiency of the patent dance is more 
suitable for dealing with patent disputes of biologics. This presents 
                                                                                                                            
286 See § 262 (l)(2)(A) (providing that the applicant must provide information that 
“describes the process or processes used to manufacture the biological product that is the 
subject of such application”). 
287 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2012) (providing for a thirty-month stay if the new 
drug application holder sues the generic small-molecule drug applicant for patent 
infringement under the Hatch-Waxman Act’s provisions within forty-five days of the 
generic’s notice letter). 
288 See § 355(j)(5)(B) (specifying the timing of approval for an abbreviated new drug 
application). 
289 Compare § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv), with § 262(l)(8)(A) (“The subsection (k) applicant shall 
provide notice to the reference product sponsor not later than 180 days before the date of 
the first commercial marketing of the biological product licensed under subsection (k).”). 
290 See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
291 See supra text accompanying note 204. 
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another reason why the patent dance should be mandatory. A man-
datory patent dance ensures that that efficiency of the patent dance 
is carried out in accordance with the compromise to maintain the 
delicate balance. 
2. A Mandatory Patent Dance Provides Certainty and 
Transparency Which Is Necessary for the BPCIA’s Balance 
Additionally, a mandatory patent dance provides certainty and 
transparency that is crucial for both the biologic and biosimilar in-
dustry.292 The BPCIA deals with extremely complex issues.293 One 
of the goals of the BPCIA is to incentivize innovation of new bi-
ologics, not just biosimilars.294 Further convoluting the path to in-
novate and mitigating the ultimate reward may jeopardize that in-
centive.295 An optional patent dance places all the power in the 
hands of the biosimilars and allows them to choose a path that best 
suits them strategically.296 Furthermore, the biologics manufactur-
ers will not know for certain if they will be able to protect their bi-
ologics because they may not be able to enforce the manufacturing 
patent(s).297 As discussed above, the manufacturing process pa-
tent(s) may be a biosimilar applicant’s strongest source of protec-
tion over the brand name biologic.298 For this issue itself, the patent 
dance should be required so that the RPS can efficiently determine, 
at the very least, if there is infringement. However, the need for 
certainty and clarity is imperative and can only be achieved when 
the steps are known (i.e., when the patent dance is mandatory).299 
Mandating the patent dance brings certainty to all parties because 
it permits the RPS, who owns (or licenses) patents that may be in-
fringed by the biosimilar product, to litigate possible infringement 
prior to the biosimilar’s market entry.300 This brings certainty to 
the biosimilar applicants (indeed, a risk-free opportunity to deter-
                                                                                                                            
292 See supra text accompanying notes 204–12. 
293 See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
294 See supra notes 13–15. 
295 Lu, supra note 12, at 626 (“Patent uncertainty seriously affects the profitability of 
innovator drug companies.”). 
296 See supra Section II.A.2. 
297 See supra Section II.B. 
298 See supra Section I.B. 
299 See supra Section III.A. 
300 See id. 
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mine whether they may market their products), and it also allows 
the innovator to avoid multi-year patent litigation proceedings 
while an infringing biosimilar product is eroding its market share.301 
3. Manufacturing Patents of Biologics 
The intersection that the BPCIA creates between pharmaceuti-
cal regulation and patent law is complex and sensitive.302 Biosimilar 
manufacturers “will be forced to create a product that is similar 
enough to satisfy the FDA, but different enough to avoid infringing 
on the reference drug’s patent.”303 However, “the product is the 
process,”304 and even small differences in a biologic’s manufactur-
ing process may cause significant differences in the clinical proper-
ties of the final product.305 Therefore, the FDA must ensure that 
the biosimilar’s manufacturing process closely resembles the 
RPS’s manufacturing process.306  As explained above, the strongest 
patents for biologics may be on the biologic’s manufacturing 
process.307 Thus, biosimilar manufacturers must find an even nar-
rower ground where they follow the process enough to comply with 
the FDA’s regulations, yet do not infringe the biologic manufac-
turer’s patents.308 The variations that are allowed by the FDA must 
also be significant enough to avoid an infringement under the doc-
trine of equivalents.309 
The key role manufacturing process patents play in biologics 
makes it crucial that the biosimilar’s private manufacturing infor-
mation is shared at the onset. Thus, the patent dance should be 
                                                                                                                            
301 See Epstein, supra note 16, at 317. 
302 See supra note 11. 
303 See Freilich, supra note 61 (offering a thorough discussion on how exactly these 
alterations may occur). 
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mandatory to ensure that the requirement to share the secret man-
ufacturing information of the biosimilar applicant is carried out. 
This ensures that the original biologics patents, if infringed upon, 
will be properly protected in a timely fashion, and indicates another 
way in which the patent dance is more efficient and transparent. 
The requirement to share the secret manufacturing information of 
the biosimilar applicant can be a disadvantage for the applicant, be-
cause sometimes they do not want it to be quick for strategy pur-
poses; however, that is exactly what the BPCIA was trying to pre-
vent. One of the countervailing goals of the BPCIA was to maintain 
the incentive to innovate.310 Inefficient patent infringement litiga-
tion and the increased uncertainty that it causes negatively impact 
innovation.311 
As discussed, the purpose of the patent dance regime of the 
BPCIA was “to ensure that litigation surrounding relevant patents 
will be resolved expeditiously and prior to the launch of the biosimi-
lar product, providing certainty to the applicant, the reference 
product manufacturer, and the public at large.”312 By sharing the 
manufacturing information upfront both parties know immediately 
which patents, if any, need to be litigated, thus bringing certainty to 
all parties.313 Additionally, the BPCIA was a negotiated compro-
mise.314 The addition of the manufacturing information was a key 
component of this compromise. The compromise was essential to 
maintain the balance of the BPCIA. A slight variation from that 
compromise may skew the balance. Thus, the patent dance should 
be mandatory as intended to protect the BPCIA’s balance. 
Contrasting the BPCIA’s patent dance with the patent in-
fringement litigation scheme of the Hatch-Waxman Act emphasiz-
es the need for the patent dance to be mandatory. Among other dif-
ferences between the BPCIA’s patent dance and the Hatch-
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Waxman Act’s patent infringement litigation scheme, the BPCIA’s 
procedures noticeably include manufacturing patents while the 
Hatch-Waxman Act’s does not.315 This alteration strongly suggests 
that this was intentional.316 The biosimilar applicant should not be 
allowed to subvert this useful aspect by opting out of the patent 
dance. Thus, the patent dance should be held to be mandatory to 
ensure that the manufacturing information is shared as it was in-
tended to be. 
CONCLUSION 
Determining exactly how to incentivize innovation in the 
pharmaceutical industry while keeping prices relatively affordable 
has historically been daunting and complicated. In drafting the 
BPCIA, Congress attempted to accomplish that challenging feat 
through transparency and communication.317 Congress solicited 
and received input from all pertinent industries, reviewed the input 
elicited, and used it to form a negotiated compromise that balances 
the countervailing goals.318 That balance is represented in the 
BPCIA, and every aspect that formed that compromise is crucial to 
maintaining the balance. The patent dance, one of those key as-
pects, provides an efficient process that allows for the patents rele-
vant to the biologic and biosimilar in question to be resolved as 
quickly as possible. This process must not be allowed to be sub-
verted at the biosimilar manufacturer’s whim. The negotiated 
compromise was a mandatory patent dance and that is what must 
be ensured.  
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